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Abstract: There are three essential sources of uncertainty in the patent system: perceived 
uncertainty due to selective sampling (“statistical artefact uncertainty”), inherent uncertainty, and 
strategic uncertainty.  It is only the strategic uncertainty source that should be of concern to 
reformers.  With respect to this source, uncertainty in the patent system is largely a function of 
two variables: the degree of inherent abstraction associated with the patent, and the degree to 
which the patent provides notice of its scope.  The maximal degree of uncertainty is observed in 
the category of abstract patents with poor notice, a category dominated today by software 




Keywords: intellectual property, patents and uncertainty, patent notice, software patent, patent 
scope, infringement litigation, abstract patents, Alice Corp., patent eligibility  
                                                 
 William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School 
of Law, knhylton@bu.edu. This is a contribution to the Boston University Law Review’s “Notice & Notice Failure 
in Intellectual Property Law” Symposium, 96 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).  I thank Ben Roin for his helpful 
suggestions as symposium commentator for this contribution. 






In August 2015 The Economist ran a leader arguing that the patent system is broken.1  The core 
of the magazine’s argument is captured in these lines: 
 
Patents are supposed to spread knowledge, by obliging holders to lay out their 
innovation for all to see; they often fail, because patent-lawyers are masters of 
obfuscation.  Instead, the system has created a parasitic ecology of trolls and 
defensive patent-holders, who aim to block innovation, or at least to stand in its 
way unless they can grab a share of the spoils.2 
 
This statement accurately reflects a critique of the patent system that has gained standing in 
recent years.3  Masters of obfuscation create uncertainty that leads to unpredictable patent rights, 
which in turn generate litigation.  Trolls and defensive patents have the perverse effect of 
reducing innovation incentives. 
 
The problem of notice in patent law, a much discussed problem of late,4 is a version of the 
obfuscation problem.  Patent lawyers, as masters of obfuscation, have given us a system that fails 
miserably in providing notice regarding the scope of patent rights.  In other words, we have a 
property system in which boundaries are unclear, and the lawyers working within the system do 
their best to keep them as unclear as possible.  If Bentham were raised from the dead, 
presumably he would point to the patent system today, rather than the system of property 
inheritance that he attacked in his time,5 as the source of sustenance for a thoroughly parasitic 
branch of the legal industry. 
 
I want to step back from this critique and look generally at the question of uncertainty in the 
patent system.  Like all property rights, patent rights cannot be perfectly certain or predictable.  
Any property right is uncertain because the state may choose to eradicate it any time.6  In 
                                                 
1 Time to Fix Patents, Economist, August 8, 2015. 
2 Id. at 11. 
3 Economists Michele Boldrin and David Levine advocate the strongest anti-patent position.  See MICHELE BOLDRIN 
& DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008).  Other critiques have 
focused on particular inefficiencies in the patent system, such as the alleged tendency toward excessive property 
fragmentation. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. MAG. 698, 698-701 (1998).  A third critique focuses on implementation problems in 
the patent system and potential solutions. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (Princeton Univ. Press 2008). 
4 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 3; DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE 
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (Univ. Of Chicago Press 2009); FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: 
ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (2011), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-and-
remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf; ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION 
AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (Princeton Univ. Press 2006). 
5 See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 267 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1986).   
6 For a discussion of uncertainty and legal rights, see Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 427, 429-434 (1995) [hereinafter Hylton, Fee Shifting]; BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW 
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addition, there is the issue of incremental or “static” uncertainty in determining the precise scope 
of a property right.7   
 
What are the sources of uncertainty in the patent system?  Is it possible to generate a framework 
for thinking about uncertainty in the patent system?  I argue that there are three essential sources 
of uncertainty in the patent system: perceived uncertainty due to selective sampling (“statistical 
artefact uncertainty”), inherent uncertainty, and strategic uncertainty.  It is only the strategic 
uncertainty source that should be of concern to reformers.  With respect to this source, 
uncertainty in the patent system is largely a function of two variables: the degree of inherent 
abstraction associated with the patent, and the degree to which the patent provides notice of its 
scope.  The two variables are not necessarily equivalent; it is possible for a patent to be abstract, 
and yet to provide nearly perfect notice of its scope.  The maximal degree of uncertainty is 
observed in the category of abstract patents with poor notice, a category dominated today by 
software patents.   
 
I offer a few principles for validating patents in this category of maximal uncertainty.  I conclude 
that software patents based on business process algorithms, such as financial hedging, or that 
optimize the consumer-firm interface should be presumptively invalid.  However, software 
patents with important spillover benefits beyond the specific application market, such as 
consumer safety enhancements, should not be presumed invalid. 
 
Part II below sets out a theoretical framework for assessing the welfare effects of uncertainty in 
the patent system, distinguishing incremental or static uncertainty from the dynamic uncertainty 
associated with the wholesale abrogation of a right.  Part III explores the concept of static 
uncertainty in patent law, which is the main focus of this paper.  Part IV extends the analysis to 
address dynamic uncertainty in patent law.  Part V concludes. 
 
II. Starting Points 
 
Before looking closely at the uncertainty problem, I should start with a statement of my premise 
on the objective of the patent system.  It is only within some definition of the system’s objective 
that we can determine whether uncertainty is socially harmful, how harmful uncertainty is likely 
to be, and precisely what types of uncertainty should concern us. 
 
In our book on the economics of intellectual property, Ron Cass and I emphasized that the 
fundamental optimality condition for the scope of an intellectual property right requires a 
balance between the static monopolization cost of exclusion and the dynamic benefit from 
encouraging innovation; in short, the scope of an intellectual property right ends where static and 
dynamic costs are roughly equal at the margin.8  Static and dynamic costs are balanced when a 
                                                 
77-96 (1961); Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1983); William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976). 
7 See Hylton, Fee Shifting, supra note 6, at 429-30 (distinguishing types of uncertainty associated with law).  The 
scope of a property right can be affected by many laws.  For example, duty doctrines in trespass law help to 
determine the scope of property rights. See Keith N. Hylton, Duty in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1501, 1510-12 (2006). 
8 RONALD A. CASS & KEITH N. HYLTON, LAWS OF CREATION: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WORLD OF IDEAS (Harvard 
Univ. Press 2013). 
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slight increase in the scope of the property right, resulting in a welfare loss from monopolization 
of $1, also increases the social benefit from additional innovation by at least $1.  We are by no 
means the first to make this point about the fundamental welfare tradeoff in determining the 
scope or duration of an intellectual property right.9  What differentiates our work is a sustained 
effort to apply this simple optimality condition explicitly as we surveyed the major doctrines of 
intellectual property law. 
 
One immediate implication of the optimal scope rule is that the bald claim that more patent 
protection leads to more innovation, and therefore enhances social welfare, is false.  One can 
increase patent protection beyond the point at which static and dynamic costs are balanced, and 
once that happens additional protection reduces social welfare, and may reduce innovation as 
well.10  Consider, for example, the nonobviousness requirement of patent law.  One could 
arguably strengthen patent protection by abolishing this requirement.  The result would be more 
patents.  However, getting rid of the nonobviousness requirement would lead to many patents 
that involve “short-step” innovation; applications of ideas that only trivially extend some existing 
technology.  As such patents multiply, so would the local monopolies associated with them, 
resulting in numerous atomistic patent monopolies.  Where those small monopolies involve 
technologies that must be combined, the problem of “successive monopoly” would arise,11 and 
the aggregate loss from monopolization would far exceed the loss that would result from a single 
monopoly that integrated all of the complementary technologies.12  Further, short-step innovation 
patents would impose significant dynamic costs as they choke off the rewards available to more 
substantial follow-on innovations.13  A version of Gresham’s Law might be observed, with low 
quality patents driving out high quality patents.14 
 
The nonobviousness requirement in our patent system functions to prevent the natural tendency 
for prospective patentees to seek patents on short-step innovations.  Such a strategy would not 
only be privately optimal for a prospective patentee, but it would be optimal for a government 
that adopts a mercantilist approach to global competition in technology.  Such a government 
would direct its patent awarding authority to give patents for short-step innovation.  
Unsurprisingly, commentators have suggested that the government of China has adopted 
                                                 
9 This tradeoff has been clear to economists since the earliest studies of the economics of patenting.  For an excellent 
survey of the economics and an application of the same theoretical argument to specific patent law doctrines, see 
Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 
(1990), though Merges and Nelson do not use the same terminology as Cass and Hylton and focus on industry-
specific differences.  The tradeoff has been emphasized for a long time in the antitrust literature. See J. Gregory 
Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS 581 (2009); 
David S. Evans & Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and Its Implications 
for the Objectives of Antitrust, 4 Competition Policy International 243 (2008).  
10 See, e.g., CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 49-55. 
11 See KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 334-335 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2003); Joseph J. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 347, 347-52 (1950).  
12 The successive monopoly problem is the fundamental economic phenomenon underlying the so-called tragedy of 
the anticommons, see Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 699. 




precisely such a strategy.15  Short-step patents would be of little value within the U.S., where 
they would be rejected by the domestic patent office.  But incumbent domestic firms operating in 
an emerging technological market would find such patents enormously useful, as a means of 
transferring wealth or technology, as foreign technology firms enter the home market and 
attempt to sell new technology or technological services there.  
  
The optimal scope rule immediately suggests that empirical studies demonstrating that patent 
strengthening is not correlated with greater innovation are not generating findings that 
necessarily undermine the value of a properly-functioning patent system.16  Making patents 
easier to get, or broader in scope, or longer in duration will not necessarily improve social 
welfare, and may reduce the overall rate of innovation.  The interesting question is not whether 
increasing the degree of protection provided by patent law is always socially desirable, but 
whether the existing set of protections is greater than or less than the socially optimal level. 
 
In spite of all that has been said about uncertainty, a patent is a property right.  Every property 
right has a monopolizing effect, even if only a trivial degree.17  If the government gives me a 
property right in an ideal location for a department store – say, in the busiest part of town – then 
it has given me a degree of monopoly power to the extent I can use the right to exclude 
competitors from that same ideal location.  However, a government might think it optimal to 
protect my property right if it could be relatively sure that the static monopolization cost to 
society is offset by investments I would make, in reliance on that right, which might enhance 
society’s welfare.  Thus, in return for having a property right in the location I have purchased, I 
may be willing to make investments in my store that are beneficial to consumers; investments 
that I would not make if my property right were not secure.  If any rival could co-locate at my 
store and sell his own goods from it, I might stop making many investments necessary to supply 
the goods and services I offer from my store.  Thus, the same general condition that applies to 
intellectual property rights appears to apply to all property rights.18 The key difference is that the 
static cost of monopolization due to property in land tends to be trivial for most tangible goods 
and products; a competing store down the street would force me to cut my prices to the 
competitive level, thus driving the static cost of geographically localized monopoly power to 
zero.  An intellectual property right such as a patent, by contrast, prevents a rival from offering 
an equivalent substitute to my patented technology, and the static cost is comparatively high 
since the marginal cost of supplying an idea is essentially zero and the spillover benefit from 
information is substantial.19 
 
In thinking about property rights, there are fundamentally two sources of uncertainty.  One is the 
dynamic uncertainty of a major alteration in the right, such as its elimination or expropriation by 
the government.  The government might decide to take my property, or deny me an exclusive 
right in it, or a right may become obsolete through changes in tastes or technology.20  This is not 
                                                 
15 Patent Fiction: Intellectual Property in China, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 13, 2014, at 73. On the surge of Chinese 
patent filings, see for example Paul Kedrosky, China Patent Surge, INFECTIOUS GREED (Oct. 16, 2006), 
http://paul.kedrosky.com/archives/2006/10/china_patent_su.html. 
16 See Josh Lerner, 150 Years of Patent Office Practice, 7 AM. ECON. REV. 112, 141-42 (2005). 
17 See Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 49 (1982). 
18 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 28-31. 
19 Id. 
20 Hylton, Fee Shifting, supra note 6, at 431-32. 
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a major source of worry for most U.S. citizens because the federal constitution protects property 
rights, though the protection is far from complete.21  The other source of uncertainty is the static 
uncertainty of ascertaining the precise scope of the right.  Nuisance law, for example, works 
consistently with these static uncertainty questions, because it is not always clear whether some 
activity that a neighbor engages in can be enjoined, thus curtailing the neighbor’s property rights, 
because the activity reduces my enjoyment of my property.22 
 
The dynamic uncertainty connected to intellectual property, especially patents and copyrights, is 
perhaps an order of magnitude greater than that associated with traditional property rights in real 
and in most types of personal property.  Intellectual property rights have a shorter history than 
rights in real property; hence, a legislature or court might view it as less disruptive of the 
political order to terminate an intellectual property right in comparison to terminating a right in 
real property.  Patents and copyrights in the U.S. are recognized as property because of a clause 
in the U.S. Constitution that recognizes these entitlements.23  An amendment to the Constitution, 
never an easy change but not impossible too, could eliminate patents and copyrights.  Indeed, if 
the case against patents stated by The Economist leader quoted at the start of this paper is correct, 
then amending the Constitution to eliminate patents would appear to be not only wise, but 
consistent with the original intent of constitutional framers.  The intellectual property clause of 
the Constitution states its purpose, unlike most other clauses of the Constitution, which is “To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”24  If patents are no longer serving this purpose, 
or worse obstructing this goal, then an amendment eliminating patent rights would further the 
clause’s stated purpose. 
 
The static uncertainty associated with intellectual property rights is the familiar stuff we see in 
intellectual property litigation.  The scope of a patent is uncertain.  For any given patent there is a 
spectrum of potentially infringing innovations, ranging from exact and intentional copies that 
clearly infringe to technologies that share only the same general function at the most abstract 
level.  Drawing the line at which the patent right ends is likely to be an imprecise endeavor in 
most cases. One can provide a general rule for drawing such a line – such as the optimality 
condition that the line should be drawn to balance static costs against dynamic costs – but even 
then the precise point at which the line should be drawn would remain unclear, and to some 
degree arbitrary, in many cases.   
                         
III. Static Uncertainty and Patents 
 
Static uncertainty is the focus of this essay, but it is difficult to understand precisely what it 
means.  Uncertainty is inherent in the patent system, as in any system that requires fine 
distinctions to be drawn by the law.  The negligence test, which often requires fine distinctions, 
generates a great deal of uncertainty.25  Moreover, the uncertainty created by negligence doctrine 
                                                 
21 Rent control, for example, seems to affect a taking, but the Supreme Court has not held that it generally violates 
the Constitution’s Takings Clause. See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).  
22 On uncertainty and cost-benefit balancing in nuisance law, see Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Nuisance Law, 
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 323, 323 (Kenneth Michael Ayotte & Henry E 
Smith eds., 2011). 
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (patent and copyright clause of the U.S. Constitution). 
24 Id. 
25 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 126-29 (1881). 
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has led to at least one famous call for its abolition, by Guido Calabresi in 1970.26  But other than 
Calabresi there have been few calls for the negligence test to be abolished.  The calls for reform 
of the patent system, by contrast, have been frequent and loud of late, leading to the question 
why the patent system should be regarded as different from the tort system in a way that requires 
deep reform. 
 
Static uncertainty in the patent system can be differentiated according to source.  I think there are 
three sources supporting the complaints of uncertainty: statistical artefact, inherent uncertainty of 
the sort that I described previously, and strategic uncertainty created by actors in the system to 
gain an advantage. 
 
A. Statistical Artefact Uncertainty 
 
Some uncertainty in the patent system can be put down to statistical artefact.  By the term 
“statistical artefact,” I mean the exaggerated appearance of systemic uncertainty resulting from 
patterns in the baseline sample from which observations are drawn.  In the patent litigation 
context, the baseline sample from which observations are drawn consists of patent lawsuits. 
Observers who study such lawsuits may find evidence consistent with increasing uncertainty in 
the patent system, both in the amount of litigation and in the unpredictability of the results.  But 
this evidence may mislead in some respects. 
 
The problem I am referring to is a familiar one.  When you drive to work in the mornings, you 
are probably stunned by the number of poor drivers you encounter on a daily basis, both people 
who drive too slow, and people who drive too fast.  But if you are a normal driver, one who 
drives within but relatively close to the speed limit, you are very likely to encounter a 
disproportionate percentage of drivers who are on the extremes.  Everyone, it seems, is a fool 
behind the wheel. 
 
Bessen and Meurer describe the huge run-up in patent litigation over the last two decades, 
attributing it the lack of “notice” in the patent system.27  However, they also show that the 
problems of notice are not rampant throughout the patent system.  Chemical and pharmaceutical 
patent litigation appears to have risen gradually in an almost lock-step relationship with the 
aggregate value of patents.28  Patents in other fields, however, have generated litigation costs that 
have far outpaced the aggregate value of patents, suggesting that the problem of uncertainty and 
notice have grown dramatically outside of the pharmaceutical patents area.29 
 
The drivers of this increase in litigation are surely worthy of careful study.  However, the timing 
of the run-up in litigation involving non-pharmaceutical patents suggests that it is related to the 
                                                 
26 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Yale Univ. Press 1970). 
27 BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 11-28. 
28 BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 15. 
29 BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 15.  However, this evidence is partially contradicted by data showing that 
patent litigation seems to track overall patents issued, and patents issued track GDP. See Brad Pederson, Patent 
Litigation: Too Much as Compared to What?, IP WATCHDOG (July 8, 2013), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/08/patent-litigation-too-much-as-compared-to-what/id=42868/.  Similar data 




introduction and rapid growth of software patents.  Non-pharmaceutical patent litigation starts to 
escalate in the mid-1990s, soon after the Federal Circuit began protecting software patents and 
around the same time that internet-based businesses, built on software patents, began to appear in 
great numbers.  The rapid entry of new internet businesses, producing a phenomenon known as 
the “dot-com bubble” in the stock market, eventually faded, as many of the businesses failed.30  
These failures laid the seeds for the modern internet businesses that have become familiar in 
today’s economy.  Over all of this time, however, software patents grew as a percentage of 
patents awarded.  By 2011, more than half of new patents awarded were for software 
inventions.31  Also by 2011, the number of lawsuits involving software-related patents exceeded 
the number of patent lawsuit filings not involving software-related patents.32  
 
The uncertainty and notice problems suggested by the escalation in patent litigation may be 
entirely due the growth of software patents – that is, to a change in the composition of the 
baseline sample from which observations are drawn.  The large increase in litigation over 
software patents likely had feedback effects in the litigation process.  As the Federal Circuit 
granted more reliable protection to software patents, its change in viewpoint likely had an effect 
on general patent law.  Bessen and Meurer suggest that the Federal Circuit’s recognition of 
software patentability distorted well-established patent law on abstraction, but only with respect 
to software.33  As a general matter, however, common law doctrines are inevitably shaped by the 
factual circumstances to which they are applied.34  Distorting the doctrine in one factual context 
creates a precedent that can be used to justify a similar distortion in a different factual context.  
Many common law rules have been overturned through the progressive applications of an 
exception that began as a specific and localized deviation from a general legal doctrine.35  Thus, 
it is unlikely that the Federal Circuit’s expansion of software patentability had no impact at all on 
the general perception of fundamental constraints on patentability, such as abstraction and 
obviousness.36 
 
The concept of abstraction, as a factor that has long weighed against a finding of patentability,37 
was de-emphasized in the Federal Circuit’s case law governing software;38 otherwise, the 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., The Dot-Com Bubble Bursts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2000), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/24/opinion/the-dot-com-bubble-bursts.html.  
31 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 13 (2013), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/aia_implementation/GAO-12-465_Final_Report_on_Patent_Litigation.pdf.  
32 Id. at 21. 
33 BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 201-12. 
34 See generally EDWARD HIRSH LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 501 (Univ. Chicago Press 1948) 
(“The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It is reasoning from case to case.”). 
35 Perhaps the most famous example is Cardozo’s opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 
1916) (Overturning common law precedent because “[p]recedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do 
not fit the conditions of travel today”).  The path leading to MacPherson is discussed in Levi, supra note 34, at 10-
27. 
36 On feedback effects of the sort described here, see Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 492 
(2011) (“Every time the Federal Circuit moves the law, the PTO will respond accordingly, becoming slightly more 
permissive in granting patents”).  
37 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010) (“[I]n order to receive the Patent Act's protection the claimed 
invention must . . . [be] fully and particularly described.”); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); CASS & 
HYLTON, supra note 8, at 59. 
38 BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 201-12. 
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explosion in software and business method patents would not have been able to occur.  As 
litigants saw that the Federal Circuit was softening its stance on abstraction as a bar to 
patentability, they must have been encouraged to litigate more often on all types of patents, 
software-related or not.   
 
The feedback effect I refer to need not have been a strong one to contribute to the litigation time-
line presented by Bessen and Meurer.  With so many software patents issued over the period of 
the litigation explosion, even a small feedback effect would be consistent with the pattern 
observed in the data. 
 
This view receives some tentative support from the post-Alice evidence on litigation, though the 
evidence is preliminary.  Alice invalidated a software patent on the ground that it embodied an 
abstract idea, and the opinion’s language suggested that many software patents would be 
invalidated under the same reasoning.39  The post-Alice data show a 13 percent decline in patent 
litigation in 2014.40  The number of patent infringement lawsuits filed in 2013 was 6,497.  The 
number of patent lawsuits filed in 2014 was 5,686.41  A probably more accurate source, Lex 
Machina, reports a patent litigation decline in 2014 of 21 percent,42 and even this is an 
understatement because the reduction should be compared to the trend line established in 
previous years,43 and should hold fixed for the number of defendants involved in litigation.44 
Alice led to the invalidation of more than 100 software patents and led many holders of software 
patents to drop their plans to sue for infringement.45 
 
Of course, this evidence is preliminary because more recent data for 2015 suggest an increase in 
patent litigation, though not enough to match the cases that would exist if litigation had 
continued according to the pre-Alice trend.46  Much of this recent uptick might be due to Alice as 
well; and some patent lawsuits are generated by the new mechanism of inter partes review at the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, which is designed to facilitate patent challenges.  The overall 
                                                 
39 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014) (“[W]holly generic computer 
implementation is not generally the sort of additional featur[e] that provides any practical assurance that the process 
is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea] itself.”).  See also Steven Seidenberg, 
Business-method and software patents may go through the looking glass after Alice decision, ABA Journal, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/business_method_and_software_patents_may_go_through_the_lookin
g_glass_after. (Feb. 1, 2015)  
40 Kevin A. Rieffel, Patent Litigation Study Should Cause Patent Reform Pause, IP WATCHDOG (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/05/20/study-should-pause-patent-reform/id=57946/. 
41 Id. 
42 2014 Patent Litigation Statistics, MARATHON PATENT GROUP (May 29, 2015), 
http://www.marathonpg.com/blog/detail/2248/2014-patent-litigation-statistics.  
43 Id. (Factoring in the past trend of 12% litigation growth year over year, “the change was actually 33% -- the 12% 
the number of lawsuits didn’t rise as expected based on past trends, plus the 21% the numbers dropped”). 
44 Correcting for the number of defendants sued suggests that the decline in patent litigation actually started in 2012.  
Holding fixed for number of defendants sued, patent litigation has been declining since the start of 2012. In fact, 
some suggest the rate of decrease is actually accelerating. No One Told John Oliver About the America Invents Act: 
Last Week Tonight Stuck in 2012, MINTZ LEVIN (Mintz Levin, Boston, M.A.), May 4, 2015, available at 
http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2015/Advisories/4920-0515-NAT-IP/  
45 See Rieffel, supra note 40. 
46 For recent data on patent lawsuit filings, see Lisa Shuchman, New Data Shows Patent Litigation Filings Up in 
2015, CORPORATE COUNSEL (June 5, 2015) http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202728387530/New-Data-Shows-
Patent-Litigation-Filings-Up-in-2015A; 2014 Patent Litigation Statistics, supra note 34. 
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effect of Alice on litigation rates will depend on the behavior of patentees and potential 
infringers.  The probability of a patentee lawsuit in response to an infringement depends on the 
percentage of patentees who perceive their patents as definitely dead under Alice versus the 
percentage who think their patents may survive.  The rate of infringement depends on the 
percentage of potential licensees who no longer perceive a need to seek a license in light of 
Alice.  The litigation rate pattern from 2014 to 2015 could be explained by a change in the 
percentage of patentees who believe they still have valid patents, or by a change in the 
percentage of potential licensees who perceive a need to seek a license, or by both factors.  One 
simple explanation of the pattern may be as follows: suppose the percentage of patentees who 
view their patents as valid dropped immediately after Alice, while the rate of infringement 
remained fixed in the short run; then suppose the rate of infringement increased dramatically a 
few months after Alice as potential licensees responded behaviorally to the implications of the 
decision.  This hypothesized set of reactions would generate a dip in patent litigation followed by 
a bounce-back surge, as observed in the data. 
 
Another factor generating the appearance of uncertainty is the lack of systemic informational 
asymmetry in many areas of patent litigation, and especially in software patents.  If one side of 
litigation (plaintiff or defendant) has a systemic informational advantage, plaintiff win rates will 
appear to be biased in favor of the informed side.47  The reason is that a defendant who knows 
that he is likely to lose under the legal standard will prefer to settle, given an offer from the 
plaintiff that reflects the average probability of winning, while the defendant who is convinced 
that he will win will prefer to litigate rather than accept such a settlement.48  For example, 
doctors have a systemic informational advantage over patients, and therefore innocent doctors 
will tend to prefer to litigate rather than accept a settlement reflecting the average likelihood of 
liability.  Consequently medical malpractice litigation tends to generate low win rates for 
plaintiffs.49  With a disproportionately large percentage of innocent doctors in the sample of 
disputes litigated to judgment, and forming the basis of appeals, the resulting appellate case law 
will appear to favor doctors,50 and will also appear not to be plagued by uncertainty.51  To an 
observer, it will all look rather simple: the doctor almost always wins.  However, in software 
patenting, it is unlikely that the patentee has any information on the patentability of his invention 
that the alleged infringer does not have as well.  In such an environment, litigation will be driven 
by idiosyncratic difference in information and errors in perception.52  As a result, anyone who 
looks at a sample of litigated patent cases will probably find no apparent pattern.  It will all look 
                                                 
47 Keith N. Hylton, Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 
188 (1993) (“[W]in rate patterns can be explained by the informational requirements of the relevant legal standard.”) 
[hereinafter Hylton, Asymmetric Information]. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 206-10. 
50 For an analysis of data on win rates at trial and on appeal in medical malpractice and other areas of litigation, see 
Michael Heise & Martin T. Wells, Understanding Plaintiff Success at Trial and on Appeal: Empirical Evidence 
from State Courts (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 15-24, 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2638846 (“[W]hile plaintiffs’ success rate at trial was only 24 percent, those plaintiffs’ 
success rate on warding off an appeal jumped to 67 percent.”). 
51 See Hylton, Asymmetric Information, supra note 47, at 189 (“[G]uilty defendants will be more likely to settle than 
innocent defendants.”). 
52 See Hylton, Asymmetric Information, supra note 47, at 204 (“[I]n-creased litigation in malpractice and product 
liability even though these win rates have remained well below 50%. This may be due to a general perception on the 
part of attorneys that the probability of success is relatively high in these areas in spite of low win rates.”). 
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so uncertain that it would appear to be anybody’s guess who would win in a patent lawsuit.  The 
finding that the success rate for plaintiffs in patent litigation is roughly 50 percent is entirely 
consistent with this conjecture.53  In addition, the data suggesting that patent holder win rates 
have moved toward fifty percent over the 2000s is consistent with a sample of cases increasingly 
consisting of software patents, which generally confer no informational advantage on either side 
of the dispute.54 
 
B. Inherent Uncertainty 
 
I have already referred to the inherent uncertainty associated with an optimal patent system.  I 
began by noting that an optimal patent system would balance static and dynamic costs in 
determining the scope of a patent along any dimension.55  For example, the optimal duration of a 
patent – whether ten, twenty, or thirty years – is a matter of trading off static and dynamic 
costs.56  If a patent system were to attempt to rigorously apply such a balancing test, it would run 
into enormous difficulties in measuring static and dynamic costs. 
 
Needless to say, courts do not explicitly apply the optimal scope test.  However, the legal tests 
that exist appear to have generated broad rules and categories of patentability (e.g., excluding 
mathematical formulae) that are consistent with the optimal scope rule.57  Of course, legal tests 
are hardly ever as precise or as demanding of economic information as optimality rules in 
economics.58  Sometimes the legal tests provide vague guidance to courts in determining the 
scope of patentability.  The rules themselves create an unavoidable degree of uncertainty and 
unpredictability in the patent litigation system. 
 
Alice is an illustration of this inherent, interstitial uncertainty in patent law.  The rule from Alice 
asks courts to determine first if the software patent embodies an abstract idea, such as hedging 
risk in financial markets.59  Second, the test asks whether the inventor has added an “inventive 
concept” to the idea,60 so that he is not merely using computer software to implement an abstract 
concept.  The combined test of abstraction-plus-inventive-concept offers distressingly little 
                                                 
53 See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 
185, 205 (1998) (“Of the 300 final validity decisions in the data set, 162 (54%) found the patent valid, and 138 
(46%) found the patent invalid.”). 
54 For a chart on patent holder win rates over time, see PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2008 PATENT LITIGATION 
STUDY: DAMAGES AWARDS, SUCCESS RATES AND TIME-TO-TRIAL 8 (2008), available at 
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog_docs/2007_PWC_Patent_Trends.pdf (last accessed 12/31/15). 
55 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 52-62. 
56 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 75. 
57 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 52-72. 
58 Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.) (“[W]hile technical 
economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those laws cannot precisely replicate the economists' 
(sometimes conflicting) views. For, unlike economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which depend 
upon the content of rules and precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers 
advising their clients. Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the 
vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve.”). 
59 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (“We must first determine whether the 
claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible [overly abstract] concept.”). 
60 Id. at 2357 (stating that the second prong of the inquiry is whether the inventor added an inventive concept that 
transforms the abstract idea into a patentable application). 
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guidance to courts on what to do with software patents.61  How is a judge to know what an 
inventive concept is, and how to identify one that is sufficiently important to enforce a patent?  
The best that courts can do, it seems, is use the facts of Bilski and Alice as precedents against 
which to judge new patents.  Still, Alice has had a large impact on perceptions of certainty, 
largely because it initially generated a widespread fear that software patents are no longer 
enforceable.62  Guidelines issued by the PTO also suggest that most software processes should 
not be awarded patents.  But the test of Alice is too vague to support this general belief, and this 
is probably the reason much litigation over software patents continues today. 
 
The Federal Circuit appeared to have a much better grasp of the inherent uncertainty problem 
than the Supreme Court.  The Federal Circuit in Bilski embraced a relatively clear, bright-line 
rule, the machine-or-transformation test, which would have effectively eliminated most software 
patents.63  In Bilski, the Supreme Court rejected the machine-or-transformation test and instead 
relied on the abstraction test that was further developed in Alice.64  As a general economic 
matter, the Supreme Court was correct to rely on the abstraction doctrine to invalidate the 
software patents in Bilski and Alice.  As the degree of abstraction increases, the static 
monopolization costs associated with a patent increase too, and the dynamic gains from spurring 
invention can be overwhelmed by the discouragement of follow-on innovation.65  However, the 
abstraction test of Alice has not been stated with sufficient clarity to serve as useful guidance in 
software patent litigation. Recall, that by 2011, nearly half of new patents issued were for 
software-related innovation. The stock of commercially valuable patents may, at this moment, 
consist largely of software patents, many of questionable value after Alice.  Moreover, many of 
these patents have value largely as preemptive forces in the marketplace, as a means of 
threatening competitors with lawsuits when they adopt software solutions to common, industry-
specific business problems.  The holders of these patents have enormous incentives to preserve 
their value, and therefore to litigate until the boundaries created by Alice have been clarified. 
 
Indeed, as Robert Merges suggested in a blog post,66 Google’s page-ranking process, a key part 
of its initial success, was awarded a software patent in 2001 (the “PageRank patent”, U.S. Patent 
                                                 
61 Steven Seidenberg, Business-method and software patents may go through the looking glass after Alice decision, 
ABA JOURNAL (Feb. 1, 2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/business_method_and_software_patents_may_go_through_the_lookin
g_glass_after (stating that District Courts are largely left up to their own discretion in determining patent-eligibility). 
62 Id. (“In almost every case since Alice in which a party asserted that such patents consisted of ineligible subject 
matter, the courts have concurred and struck down the patent.”). 
63 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A claimed process involving a fundamental principle that uses a 
particular machine or apparatus would not pre-empt uses of the principle that do not also use the specified machine 
or apparatus in the manner claimed. And a claimed process that transforms a particular article to a specified different 
state or thing by applying a fundamental principle would not pre-empt the use of the principle to transform any other 
article, to transform the same article but in a manner not covered by the claim, or to do anything other than 
transform the specified article.”). 
64 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (“The patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on 
the unpatentability of abstract ideas . . . nothing in today's opinion should be read as endorsing . . . [the exclusive use 
of] the machine-or-transformation test . . . .”). 
65 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 52-62. 
66 Robert Merges, Symposium: Go ask Alice — what can you patent after Alice v. CLS Bank?, SCOTUSBLOG, (Jun. 
20, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patent-after-alice-
v-cls-bank/ (“The Page patent claims what is known as the page rank algorithm: a way of weighting web pages by 
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6,285,999, issued September 4, 2001) which may be questionable today under Alice.  An 
algorithm for optimizing search by ranking web pages is just a mathematical algorithm 
performed on data.  The notion of search optimization through a ranking system is certainly an 
abstract idea.  These factors suggest that the PageRank patent is invalid under Alice.  However, 
the case in favor of Google’s patent is that it is not a general algorithm such as hedging, and it 
produces a specific machine, the Google search process.  But this justification is itself 
questionable because the “search machine” is just the software process that implements the 
algorithm.67  In any event, other large businesses may also have such patents sitting at their 
foundations.  This is quite a substantial force with incentives to push against an interpretation of 
Alice that would eradicate business-related software patents. 
 
C. Strategic Uncertainty 
 
Perhaps the most important source of static uncertainty in patent law is strategic, resulting from 
the strategic actions of participants in the patent system.68  Within this category of uncertainty, 
the conduct of patentees appears to loom largest. Patent applicants, working with patent lawyers, 
frame their patent claims in a deliberately vague fashion in order to capture as much of the 
foreseeable and unforeseeable related innovation that might arise within the duration of the 
patent.69  Vague and abstract wording of claims broadens the net of captured innovation, and also 
obstructs the efforts of others to find design-arounds of the patent.  
 
This is a natural tendency within any patent system; the self-interest of patent applicants will 
always lead them to push for the broadest scope of claims that can be defended.  Because of this 
incentive, the most important function of the courts is to provide doctrines limiting the scope of 
patents, which the courts have done, most prominently with the abstraction doctrine relied on in 
Alice.70  Moreover, the incentive to broaden the scope of patent claims has existed for a long 
time – long before the recent explosion in patent litigation.71  The patent administrative process 
could be reformed to limit the use of this strategy on the part of patent applicants.72  However, 
the courts provide a useful check, indeed the most important check, independent of the 
administrative process.  The Supreme Court recently limited the potential for drafters to assert 
the most expansive claims by demanding notice with reasonable certainty in Nautilus v. Biosig,73 
                                                 
the density of links to them. . . . If a court were to become convinced that the Page patent claimed the abstract idea 
of “weighting,” it might be invalid.”).  
67 But this may not matter because Google probably relies more on the secrecy of its search optimization methods 
more than the protection provided by 1998 patent. 
68 Bessen and Meurer make much of this source of uncertainty in explaining the great increase in patent litigation 
over the last two decades.  See BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 147-64. 
69 Cf. BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 154 (“[T]he clear boundaries provided by patents on chemical 
structures and compositions explain the overall superior performance of the patent system in these industries.”). 
70 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (stating one policy rationale for limiting 
the scope of patent law, through rules against abstraction, as a concern for preserving further discovery and 
invention). 
71 ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES (Univ. of Chicago 
Press, 2009). 
72 Bessen and Meurer propose changes in the patent administrative system to limit the ability of patent applicants to 
expand the scope of their claims See BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 244- 47. 
73 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“[A] patent must be precise enough to 
afford clear notice of what is claimed.”). 
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overturning an earlier rule that required only that claims not be “insolubly ambiguous.”  The 
Federal Circuit’s decision in Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC74 represents yet another recent step 
toward improving the incentives of claim drafters, though there is still much more that can be 
done.75 
 
The label “notice” offers a useful category for thinking about strategic uncertainty.  Notice 
suggests an effort to signal, and in this context it is the signaling of patent boundaries that 
matters.  Abstraction is another useful category concept.  Abstraction is a more primitive feature 
that refers to the nature of the patent claim.  A claim to patent a purely mathematical relationship 
is inherently abstract because it covers all uses of the relationship regardless of the precise form 
of its embodiment in some technology.  Thus a patent can differ along the dimensions of notice 
and abstraction, generating the combinations of: (1) abstract with notice, (2) abstract without 
notice, (3) not abstract with notice, and (4) not abstract without notice. 
 
Consider the first combination, abstract with notice.  What is an example of such a patent?  The 
patent in Bilski seems to be a perfect example: a patent for hedging risk in energy markets.76  The 
patent probably did not suffer from a lack of notice.  Anyone in the relevant industry who used a 
computer program to hedge risk in energy markets would have been able to determine that he 
may have infringed the patent in Bilski. The reason for rejecting the patent in Bilski was the 
problem of abstraction, that it preempted a vast set of applications that had been carried on by 
businesses for a long time.77  The static monopolization cost of enforcing the patent in Bilski was 
potentially enormous, and almost surely in excess of any gains in spurring the particular 
innovation, which would have occurred anyway from the desire and need to gain efficiency in a 
routine business endeavor.  Market competition alone would push businesses to adopt hedging 
strategies and to use computer programs to help them implement those strategies. 
 
Next, consider the second combination, abstract without notice.  Bessen and Meurer offer fine 
illustrations of this problem in their discussions of the E-Data and Blackberry-RIM disputes.78  
The E-Data example involved vague, nearly unintelligible patent claims, later interpreted 
expansively to cover not only the electronic production of digital music recordings, its original 
intended scope, but also general online commercial transactions.79  One recent example in the 
courts involves a series of infringement lawsuits launched by EMG Technology LLC, all filed in 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, against several large firms for infringing 
                                                 
74 Williamson v. Citrix Online LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[I]f a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would be unable to recognize the structure in the specification and associate it with the corresponding function in the 
claim, a means-plus-function clause is indefinite [patent invalid]”). 
75 See BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 24-27 (outlining reforms to improve notice). 
76 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010) (“[A] claimed invention that explains how buyers and sellers of 
commodities in the energy market can protect, or hedge, against the risk of price changes.”). 
77 Id. at x (“The patent application here can be rejected under our precedents on the unpatentability of abstract ideas. 
. . . These claims attempt to patent the use of the abstract idea of hedging risk in the energy market and then instruct 
the use of well-known random analysis techniques to help establish some of the inputs into the equation.”) 
78 BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 8-9 (E-Data); BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 48-50 (Blackberry-
RIM). 
79 In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit defined the patent at issue broadly by, for instance, defining 
point of sale location as any location with an Internet connection. BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 9. 
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its 2003 patents for navigating a website on a cellphone.80  Perhaps in 2003 the concept of 
navigating a website on a cellphone may have seemed less than obvious or fully anticipated in 
practice.  The defendants have noted that the patent involved little more than a decision tree for 
guiding a computer program.81 
 
These cases are distinguishable from Bilski in the sense that the abstract concept in Bilski is well 
known and was in practice for centuries in financial markets before the patent at issue was 
sought.  The only innovation involved implementing a financial hedging algorithm through a 
computer program.  The cases in the “abstract without notice” category, by contrast, involve 
rather general conceptual functions.  EMG Technology’s patent for navigating a website from a 
mobile device sought to capture a property right in a routine conceptual function, website 
navigation from a mobile device, that would soon dominate electronic commerce.  The E-Data 
patent covered “reproducing information” at “point of sale location”, a conceptual function that 
would appear to encompass all of online commercial activity.82 
 
The third category, not abstract and with notice, consists of the sorts of inventions that have been 
associated with the patent system since its inception.  Abraham Lincoln was granted a patent for 
a mechanism for lifting a boat over shoals.83  This was at a time when patent applicants were 
required to present a model of the invention.84  The prototype, still in existence, disproves any 
assertion that the invention was abstract in nature, and its utility was obvious.  Still, the invention 
did not meet commercial success, failing to liberate Lincoln from his occupation as a lawyer with 
public service aspirations. 
 
One could argue that the Lincoln patent was also a conceptual-functions patent, as I have used 
the term.  The concept was to prevent a boat from being trapped by a sand bar, which was a 
serious danger in Lincoln’s day.  The waters near Bermuda are littered with sunken ships caught 
by the numerous shoals and coral reefs surrounding the island.  The difference between the 
traditional patent of Lincoln’s and the modern patents for functions such as web navigation is the 
implementation through software.  Software patents, all essentially algorithms, inherently 
generate questions of scope that are not generated by physical machines or processes.  Because 
                                                 
80 Complaint, EMG Technology LLC v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co, No. 6:15-cv-00498 (E.D. Tex. May 
27, 2015); Complaint, EMG Technology LLC v. Dillard's Inc., No. 6:15-cv-00499 (E.D. Tex. May 27, 2015); 
Complaint, EMG Technology LLC v. Dollar General Corp., No. 6:15-cv-00500 (E.D. Tex. May 27, 2015); 
Complaint, EMG Technology LLC v. Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group Inc., No. 6:15-cv-00501 (E.D. Tex. May 27, 
2015); Complaint, EMG Technology LLC v. Family Dollar Stores Inc., No. 6:15-cv-00502 (E.D. Tex May 27, 
2015); Complaint, EMG Technology LLC v. GameStop Corp., No. 6:15-cv-00503 (E.D. Tex. May 27, 2015); 
Complaint, EMG Technology LLC v. Hallmark.com LLC, No. 6:15-cv-00504 (E.D. Tex. May 27, 2015); 
Complaint, EMG Technology LLC v. Pier 1 Imports Inc., No. 6:15-cv-00505 (E.D. Tex. May 27, 2015). 
81 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 10-11, EMG Technology LLC v. Dollar General Corp., No. 6:15-cv-00500 
(E.D. Tex. May 27, 2015) (“The Asserted Patents thus amount to nothing more than claims covering a visual phone 
tree or a Choose-Your-Own-Adventure novel—that is, a simple decision tree. . . . Nothing contained in any claim 
elevates these patents beyond the abstract ideas that have been practiced by hand in various forms for decades.”). 
82 BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
83 U.S. Patent No. 6,469 (issued May 22, 1849). 
84 See, e.g., BESSEN AND MEURER, supra note 3, at 66.  Models were required of patent applicants until 1880. See, 
e.g., Kendall J. Dood, Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790-1880 (Part II –Conclusion), 65 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
234, 271 (1983). 
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of this, I will aim my remarks on the problems associated with conceptual-functions patents at 
software patents. 
 
The fourth category, not abstract without notice, can exist only in special scenarios.  The classic 
submarine patent might fall in this category.85  The submarine patent begins as a vague 
application that morphs over time into specific claims issued, covering technologies actually on 
the market.  Once the patent issues, the patentee seeks royalties from existing firms.  
Alternatively, in a patent system that simply fails to record patents awarded or currently in force, 
there could be non-abstract patents in existence whose records proving current validity cannot be 
found, and therefore fail to provide notice.  The submarine patent problem has been reduced in 
importance by recent legislation, though it has been a prominent failure of the U.S. patent system 
for many years. 
 
The most important source of strategic uncertainty in the patent system today comes from the 
conceptual-functions software patents that now dominate the “abstract without notice” category.  
While Bilski-like patents – algorithms implemented with software – are troubling, they do not 
pose the same threats to innovation as conceptual-functions patents.  Bilski-like patents merely 
seek to appropriate the efficiency gains from computing software. These gains are significant, 
but their appropriation is unlikely to hinder innovation in the techniques reduced to computing.  
For example, the development of new hedging algorithms is unlikely to be discouraged by 
enforcing algorithmic patents of the sort in Bilski.  Specialists in mathematical finance, doing 
basic research on optimization methods in financial markets, probably would have similar 
incentives to discover more efficient hedging algorithms irrespective of the ultimate patentability 
of computer programs implementing those algorithms. 
 
Conceptual-functions patents, by contrast, threaten to appropriate gains from innovation in 
business and operational methods.  If EMG Technology can enforce its patents for website 
navigation, it will put itself in a position to tax firms that take advantage of a new forum for 
commerce, online search and purchase from mobile devices, which it did virtually nothing to 
help create.  The gains from trade would be reduced by this tax, reducing the size of the market 
for online transactions.  The gains that should go to consumers and businesses for exploiting new 
business and operational methods made available by information technology would be siphoned 
off to the holders of these patents.86 
                                                 
85 See generally Steve Blount, The use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and Amend Around A 
Patent that A Competitor has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 13-17 (1999) (providing 
background on the submarine patent problem). 
86 EMG Technology is not the only firm attempting to enforce a conceptual-functions software patent that 
appropriates gains from innovation in operational and business methods.  Here are four prominent and similar cases.  
(1) Data management and storage: Evolutionary Intelligence LLC had its patents on data management and storage 
held invalid under Alice, with defendants’ lawyers noting that Evolutionary Intelligence’s patents covered a process 
similar to that of looking for books on a topic at the library, or going through the books’ checkout history to see 
whether they had been checked out frequently. See Evolutionary Intelligence, LLC v. Sprint Nextel Corp, No. 5:13-
cv-04513, 2015 WL 5829783 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2015) (dismissing cases against Yelp, Inc., Facebook, Inc., 
Foursquare Labs Inc., LivingSocial Inc., Twitter Inc., Groupon Inc., Apple Inc., Millennial Media Inc., and Sprint 
Nextel Corp..); Daniel Langhorne, Apple, Facebook Beat Data Processing, Storage Patent Suits, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 
2015, 10:42 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/712337/apple-facebook-beat-data-processing-storage-patent-




Alice is not, at present, an adequate legal framework for conceptual-functions software patents.  
The doctrinal test of Alice is too vague to provide much guidance in this area.  The factual 
precedents provided by Alice and Bilski are narrow and do not involve conceptual-functions 
patents.  Alice should be understood to set up a presumption of invalidity for business or 
financial algorithms reduced to computer programs.87  One recent proposed application of Alice, 
to an algorithm for gambling on horse races,88 should start with a presumption of invalidity under 
this view.  Again, algorithmic patents involve efforts to appropriate the gains from software or 
information technology generally.  They are unlikely to be necessary to spur, or even important 
in encouraging, innovation on the level of optimizing algorithms; every gambling house has an 
incentive to find optimal methods of exploiting punters.89 
                                                 
(2) Video on demand: A federal court in Hawaii invalidated Broadband iTV’s patents covering video-on-demand 
technology. Broadband iTV Inc. v. Oceanic Time Warner Cable LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00131, 2015 WL 5768943, at 
*17 (D. Haw. Sept. 29, 2015) (“[I]t nonetheless appears that the '336 Patent claims an abstract idea without 
sufficient inventive concept under Alice. It is therefore ineligible for patenting under Section 101, and invalid for 
enforcement against TWC.”); see Vin Gurrieri, TWC, Hawaiian Telecom Get On-Demand Patent Nixed By Alice,  
LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2015, 6:56 PM) (“The judge noted in both orders that Broadband iTV offered no suggestion of 
what the patent does claim if not an abstract idea and said that the patent was essentially aimed at automating a 
process that, in an earlier time, was done manually.”).   
(3) Video and music streaming: Affinity Labs of Texas LLC had its patent for browsing and streaming digital media 
invalidated, because it involves an abstract idea.  See Affinity Labs of Texas LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 6:15-cv-
00029 (W.D. Tex. 2015); Gail Sullivan, Amazon Shuts Down Patent Suit Over Music Store, App, LAW360 (Sept. 24, 
2015, 12:58 PM) (“[T]he patent for browsing and streaming digital media belonging to Affinity Labs of Texas LLC 
is invalid because it involves an abstract idea.”).  
(4) Web shopping carts:  eDekka LLC had its web shopping cart patent invalidated, after suing numerous 
businesses, because it claimed only abstract ideas. eDekka LLC v. 3Balls.com Inc., No. 15-cv-00541, 2015 WL 
5579840, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2015) (“The Court finds that no inventive concept exists to transform the 
claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible concept.”); Matthew Bultman, EDekka Shopping Cart Patent Knocked 
Out Under Alice, LAW360 (Sept. 23, 2015, 7:37 PM) (“A Texas federal judge has invalidated a Web shopping cart 
patent that notorious litigator eDekka LLC has sued scores of online retailers for infringing, finding the patent 
claimed only abstract ideas.”). 
87 As another example of algorithmic patenting that should fall under the scope of Alice, consider auctions.  “The 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board has invalidated an auction patent that Jewelry Television had sued rival network, The 
Jewelry Channel Inc. USA, for infringing, finding the patent claimed only an abstract idea and thus making it invalid 
under the U.S. Supreme Court's Alice decision.”  Matthew Bultman, Jewelry Channel Gets Rival’s Auction Patent 
Axed Under Alice, Law360 (Oct. 20, 2015, 5:10 PM) (“In a final written decision in an America Invents Act review, 
the PTAB on Friday held the patent’s claims were directed to the underlying, abstract idea of a reverse auction. It 
rejected Jewelry Television’s argument that it added the “inventive concept” of using certain indicators to reduce the 
quantity of a product before a sale, making it patent eligible.”). 
88 See Complaint at 1-2, RaceTech LLC v. Kentucky Downs LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00059 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 2015) 
(“This is an action for infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,450,887 (“the ʼ887 patent”) and 6,358,150 (“the ʼ150 
patent”) (together, “the Asserted Patents”), brought by RaceTech against Kentucky Downs and Encore Gaming.”); 
Jeff Zalesin, RaceTech Says Horse Race Betting Patents Survive Alice, LAW360 (July 31, 2015, 3:07 PM) 
(“Gambling machine maker RaceTech LLC told a Kentucky federal judge on Thursday that horse racing venue 
Kentucky Downs LLC and a rival gambling technology company can’t invalidate its historical racing patents, 
arguing that a patent examiner already approved the claims under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Alice decision.”). 
89 A set of similar patent claims involves web-based promotional sweepstakes, often connected with online gaming.   
(1) Distributing promotional benefits to online gamers: Inventor Holdings LLC had its patent for distributing 
promotions invalidated as abstract. Inventor Holdings LLC v. Gameloft Inc., No. 1:14-cv-01067, 2015 WL 
5769220, at *12 (D. Del. Sept. 20, 2015) (dismissing cases against Gameloft Inc., GLU Mobile Inc., King.com Ltd., 
NGMOCO, LLC, Rovio Animation Company, and Supercell, Inc. because the ‘198 patent for distributing 




Another recent proposed application of Alice to a conceptual-functions patent helps shed light on 
the problems in this area.  The holder of a patent for a test of driver impairment sued Mercedes 
for infringement, and the district court judge held that the patent was invalid under Alice.90  The 
patentee, Kevin Roe, filed an appeal to the Federal Circuit, arguing that his innovation includes 
several inventive concepts and that his claims to do not preempt the abstract idea of testing driver 
impairment. The patentee also noted that his innovation was an important, potentially life-saving 
technology.91 
 
Stepping back, it does seem difficult on the most abstract level to distinguish Roe’s patent from 
Lincoln’s.  Both involve conceptual functions, the former testing driver impairment and the latter 
preventing boats from being stranded on shoals.  Both are potentially life-saving, and hence have 
a value beyond their commercial measure.  The difference is that one is software and the other is 
a physical device.  Why should Alice apply to one and not the other? 
 
The short reason Alice is applicable to Roe’s patent and not to Lincoln’s (if it were to be created 
fresh today) is that Roe’s, as a software patent, is essentially an algorithm.  As an algorithm, it 
creates the risk that it will preempt new algorithms directed toward the same conceptual 
function.  That is a sufficient reason for finding Alice potentially applicable to Roe’s patent.   
 
The danger presented by Alice is that it threatens to invalidate innovations that could be 
enormously beneficial to society.  A test for driver impairment could significantly reduce the 
number of alcohol or sleep-related fatal accidents on the roads. This is a significant problem, the 
solution to which would yield spillover benefits for everyone, whether automobile drivers or 
pedestrians. 
 
Moreover, it is not clear that the market will always provide a sufficient incentive for life-saving 
innovations such as the Lincoln patent or the Roe patent (assuming the purported innovation is 
effective).  A car maker might find that it generates no additional sales from installing an 
enhanced driver impairment testing mechanism, and that it gains little by advertising on this 
                                                 
Makers Get Patent Nixed By Alice, LAW360 (Sept. 30, 2015, 8:40 PM) (“Judge Stark agreed with the defendants 
that the '198 patent describes a way of using codes to unlock benefits in a mobile game, which the judge said is just 
an abstract idea that cannot be patented under Alice.”).  
(2) Sweepstakes prizes for online gamers: Everglades Game Technologies LLC’s patent covering a method “to give 
sponsors “total control over game piece distribution and price awards,” primarily through the use of computer 
technology” in “collect-and-win” or “match-and-win” games was invalidated under Alice.  Everglades Game 
Technologies LLC v. Supercell, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00641, 2015 WL 4999654, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2015) (“The 
court agrees with Supercell that each of the claims of the '050 Patent lack meaningful limitations on the abstract 
idea.”). 
90 Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA LLC, 78 F. Supp. 3d 884 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“The 
claims in this case broadly relate to the concept of testing operators of any kind of moving equipment for any kind of 
physical or mental impairment. This concept qualifies as an abstract idea . . . ” and, moreover, not an inventive 
concept). 
91 In December 2015, the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.  
The Federal Circuit, reviewing de novo, found that the claims are not limited to a specific type of impairment, nor 
explain how the impairment tests are performed, and don’t explain how the “expert system” improves upon prior 
systems.  Vehicle Intelligence & Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2015-1411, 2015 WL 9461707, at 
*5 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 28, 2015) (“The claims merely state the abstract idea of testing an equipment operator for 
impairments using an unspecified “expert system” running on equipment that already exists in various vehicles.”). 
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matter.  A private individual, however, may be encouraged by the rewards of the patent system 
to develop such a technology, and seek to make a profit by promoting the technology to car 
makers or to regulatory authorities.  In addition, a car manufacturer, if it had a sufficient 
incentive to develop such a technology, would use it to gain an advantage in the market over 
rivals.  The individual inventor, in contrast, has no incentive to distort the market in favor of one 
particular firm; his incentive is to license the innovation to all.  These arguments suggest that 
society should be reticent to adopt rules in the patent system that deny patent law’s 
encouragement to certain safety-enhancing innovations. 
 
Important distinctions between web navigation patents and impairment testing should be noted.  
Web navigation is one of many functions that every business has an incentive to optimize for its 
customers, patents available or not.  Competition will drive firms to adopt such functions.  
General technologies that improve safety across an entire industry are not necessarily functions 
that every business has an incentive to develop, a proposition established in the law since 
Learned Hand’s opinion in The T.J Hooper.92  Some of the victims of unsafe conditions may not 
be customers of the industry – and the industry will have little incentive to devote resources to 
reduce such external losses.93  The costs of developing a safety technology may be high, the 
benefits may not be appropriable, and competition may not reward such innovations. 
 
This suggests at least one principle that should be adopted for conceptual-functions patents: 
Conceptual-functions patents related to optimizing consumer-firm interactions should be 
presumptively ineligible for patents.  Every business has an incentive to optimize its interactions 
with consumers – to make its websites navigable by mobile devices, to order its messages to and 
from consumers efficiently,94 to suggest alternative and higher priced goods or services,95 and so 
on.  The patent system should not grant exclusive rights in customer-oriented or supplier-
oriented business functions. 
 
If the presumption against patentability suggested by Alice is to be extended beyond algorithmic 
patenting into conceptual-functions patenting, which I have suggested may be desirable, the next 
set of concepts to bring under Alice are those involving the customer-firm or supplier-firm 
interface.  The doctrinal test of Alice can remain without doing any harm; it is too vague to have 
much of an impact anyway on its own.  If there is any practical rule that Alice should stand for, it 
is for a presumption against patent eligibility for both algorithmic software applications and for 
                                                 
92 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). 
93 Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 39 (1972) (“Suppose the only benefit of a safety 
appliance is to a stranger to the industry in our earlier sense-someone with whom the enterprise has no contractual 
relationship and will not enter into one because of transaction costs. No firm in the industry will have an incentive to 
install the appliance . . . .”). 
94 Two business-messaging patents asserted against Hewlett-Packard and Adobe were recently found invalid under 
Alice. YYZ, LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 13-136, 2015 WL 5886176, at *9 (D. Del. Oct. 8, 2015) (holding that 
the custom messaging component is neither specifically claimed nor sufficiently innovative and is therefore not 
patent-eligible). In a different and recent case, Home Depot was sued for infringing a patent that lets customers 
choose whether to have their receipts printed or emailed to them. Complaint at 3-4, eCeipt LLC v. Home Depot Inc., 
No. 2:15-cv-01672 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2015). Based on the argument of this paper, this claim should be rejected 
under Alice. 
95 See Tuxis Tech. LLC v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 13-1771, 2014 WL 4382446 (D. Del. Sept. 3, 2014) (invalidating 
under Alice a patent for “upselling” – i.e., suggesting pricier options – to online consumers.) 
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business methods that enable firms to sell, advertise, or interact with consumers more efficiently.  
This subset of conceptual functions should be left to the process of Schumpeterian competition.96 
 
For conceptual functions with potentially life-saving applications (such as the driver impairment 
testing claimed by the Roe patent), Alice must tread much more cautiously.97  The reason is that 
the additional incentive provided by the patent system for life-saving innovations should be 
considered worth preserving, and the market may be insufficient as a spur to such innovation.  
On the other hand, these patents have to be assigned boundaries.  Although the principle 
disfavoring abstraction is well entrenched in patent law, it should be modified to constrain 
patentees more effectively in this area.  A doctrine shifting the burden of proof to the patentee to 
show that his patent really does have boundaries and that there are realistic methods of 
innovation within the same conceptual function that are not preempted may be appropriate.  
Alice may have had this effect already. 
 
My suggestion goes beyond life-saving innovations.  Inventions occur along a spectrum from 
fundamental science, to production-oriented engineering, to methods that serve consumers or 
end-users efficiently.  Fundamental science has in large parts (math, physics) been and should be 
considered ineligible for patents.  Innovations that make the firm-consumer or firm-supplier 
interface more efficient should also be ineligible because the market is a sufficient spur.  The 
production-oriented engineering level is where patents are most effective in enhancing social 
welfare, and much of this innovation is taking the form of software today.  Alice is clearly 
applicable to this type of innovation.  Where there is a danger of granting a property right in the 
abstract conceptual function, the burden should shift to the patentee to argue that his right will 
not preempt future innovation within the same conceptual function during the patent’s term. 
 
The precise boundary of Alice is unsurprisingly impossible to delineate with precision on the 
basis of general principles.  Software that primarily optimizes the consumer-firm or supplier-firm 
interaction, or similarly facilitates business processes, should face a presumption of ineligibility 
under Alice.  Potentially life-saving technology generally should not face such a presumption.  
Software in the online security area seems to fall somewhere in between these two poles.98  
                                                 
96 CASS & HYLTON, supra note 8, at 71 (“Schumpeterian creative destruction, involves the continual introduction of 
new methods that lead at times to temporary monopolies but are eventually copied by competitors. Patents might 
provide an additional incentive to develop new methods, but they will also obstruct the process of dissemination and 
emulation that is core to dynamic competition.”). 
97 I should be clear that this suggestion is limited to Alice as a doctrine for invalidating patents.  More traditional 
doctrines for invalidating patents, such as obviousness, do not have to tread cautiously as suggested here.  
Traditional grounds for invalidating patents have been in operation for many years and should not be affected by 
Alice.  For example, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board granted TRW Automotive US LLC’s petition for inter partes 
review of a driver-assistance camera patent belonging to Magna Electronics Inc. after a reasonable likelihood TRW 
will be able to prove the patent is anticipated by previous technology.  TRW Auto. US LLC v. Magna Elec. Inc., 
P.T.A.B. No. IPR2015-00923, 2015 WL5818392 (Patent Tr. & App. Bd. Oct. 1, 2015).  Although this is an example 
of a “driver safety” innovation similar to the Roe patent discussed in the text, the difference is that the PTAB is 
reexamining the patent on obviousness grounds, not on the basis of Alice. 
98 To a degree, the Federal Circuit seems to have edged toward the principles offered here in its DDR opinion, 
creating an exception to Alice for software “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a 
problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”  DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 
F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  But this limitation is too general under the theory of this paper and might extend 
to online security systems that are functionally equivalent to general site security at a factory.  In any event, the 
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Online security software may serve to protect a firm’s data from expropriation from rivals, which 
is a purely business-centered function that is likely to be spurred sufficiently by market forces 
without the need for patent protection.  Some online security, by contrast, may serve to protect 
consumers from identity theft, which provides benefits beyond the boundaries of the firm’s own 
balance sheet.  Indeed, given that the primary costs of identity theft fall on the consumer rather 
than the firm, a profit-oriented firm may have weak incentives to protect the consumer from such 
theft.  The firm may trade off greater convenience in consumer transactions in exchange for less 
protection of the consumer.  Just as in the case of the Lincoln patent, the market may provide 
inadequate incentives for firms to invest in innovations of this type.  However, generally, the 
degree to which innovation provides important benefits to the public external to the firm’s own 
income or expenses suggests a fundamental basis for identifying types of innovation that should 
be approached with great care under Alice. 
 
These considerations suggest the following framework for Alice as a tool for controlling strategic 
uncertainty in the patent system: (1) business method software algorithms, such as the hedging 
program in Bilski, should be presumptively invalid; (2) software designed to optimize consumer-
firm or supplier-firm interactions should be presumptively invalid; and (3) software innovation 
with substantial beneficial spillovers beyond the application market – for example, to enhance 
consumer safety or to preserve life – should not be presumptively invalid, though shifting the 
burden of proving specific boundaries to the patentee may be appropriate. 
 
IV. Dynamic Uncertainty and Patents 
 
Dynamic uncertainty, recall, is the risk of a wholesale reversal or expiration of a property right.  
This essay is on static uncertainty and patents, but there are connections between static 
uncertainty and dynamic uncertainty.   
 
The great escalation in patent litigation over the last two decades appears to be largely 
attributable to the introduction of software patents.99  This escalation has in turn increased the 
degree of dynamic uncertainty in the patent system.  Calls for deep patent reform, and even for 
the abolition of patents have received a more respectful hearing lately.  I doubt that Boldin and 
Levine’s aggressive attack on patents, Against Intellectual Monopoly,100 would have generated 
the interest that it has if the modern wave of patent litigation driven by software had not arisen.  
The Economist magazine followed its leader criticizing the patent system with a longer piece in 
the same issue that closes with suggestions for reforming the patent system, such as reducing 
patent terms, differentiating terms across types of innovation, and experimenting with prizes.101 
 
Luckily for patent holders, wholesale abolition is unlikely given the need for a constitutional 
amendment.  However, changing the patent term, or differentiating terms according to the type 
                                                 
DDR decision has created an area in which Alice is applied cautiously. See, e.g., Vin Gurrieri, PTAB Rejects Bids 
For Computer Security Patent Reviews, LAW360 (Sept. 28, 2015, 4:17 PM).     
99 James Bessen offers useful data on software patents and litigation. His message is that software patents tend to get 
litigated, tend to have invalid claims, and are frequently picked up by trolls. James Bessen, The case against 
software patents, in 9 charts, VOX (Sept. 15, 2014, 11:08 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/7/7/5862284/9-charts-
that-show-patents-are-bad-for-the-software-industry. 
100 MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008). 
101 A Question of Utility, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2015. 
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of innovation (software versus pharmaceutical) may be well within Congress’s power, as 
suggested in Eldred v. Ashcroft.102  Such changes can visit the same effect as wholesale abolition 
on a subset of patent holders, and redistribute the rewards of the patent system toward one set of 
entitlement holders and away from others. 
 
The problem with patent reform is that any legislative effort of this sort will generate feverish 
interest group lobbying.  Interest group lobbying is nothing new; the fact that it occurs was 
offered by the plaintiff in Eldred as a reason to deny Congress the power to increase copyright 
terms, an argument promptly rejected by the Court.103  The core problem with legislative 
tampering is that the most effective interest groups are likely to be large corporations that spend 
heavily on lobbying.  Thus, any substantial reform of the patent system will tend to reflect the 
interests of large businesses, not independent inventors.  The switch from first-to-invent to first-
to-file in the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA) coincides with the interests of large businesses 
with the resources to manage patent prosecution efficiently.104 
 
The rent seeking and hence dynamic uncertainty risks associated with patent reform are perhaps 
most evident in the high-stakes patent infringement dispute between Apple and Samsung.105  
After winning a patent infringement trial against Samsung, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
later ruled that one of the patents found to be infringed in the trial was invalid in an inter partes 
review process initiated by Samsung.106  The interesting and novel feature of this event is that an 
administrative agency, the patent office, effectively reversed a decision by a federal district court 
finding a particular patent valid.  To a student of public choice economics, or of the history of 
patent law, this is a troubling sequence of events, invoking issues that had been long buried in 
English patent reforms centuries ago.  To offer a simplistic analogy, it as if the king awarded a 
patent, an independent judge found the patent to have been infringed, and the infringer went 
directly to the king and asked him to revoke the patent.  The obvious danger in this simple story 
is that the infringer might be a relative, friend, or patron of the king, and therefore in a position to 
persuade the king to take a far less objective view of the dispute than that taken by the judge.  
The English courts appeared to have solved this problem in 1607 with Darcy v. Allen divorcing 
the king’s preferences from the standard by which judges would enforce patents against 
infringers.107 
 
The patent review processes of the AIA partially resuscitate the problem of executive 
intermeddling in the enforcement of patents.  Obviously, the federal patent office is quite a bit 
removed from the simple-minded king in my example, but it is part of the executive branch, not 
part of the judicial branch which has for many years had the final word on the validity of a 
patent.  The great difference between the executive and the judicial branches is that the agents of 
the latter are relatively distant from the lobbying pressures imposed on and originating from the 
                                                 
102 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (“[T]he Copyright Clause empowers Congress to determine the intellectual property 
regimes that, overall, in that body's judgment, will serve the ends of the Clause.”). 
103 See id. at 203 (upholding retroactivity of an exemption). 
104 See, e.g., Andrew L. Sharp, Note, Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable Constitutionality of First-to-File, 
84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1227, 1263 (2013) 
105 See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v Samsung Electronics Co., 735 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
106 USPTO Reexamination No. 90/012,884 (non-final rejection of Patent No. D618,677). 
107 Darcy v. Allen, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (King's Bench 1620). 
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executive branch.108  To permit an executive agency to reverse a decision by a federal judge is to 
take a step in the direction of a politicized patent system, which opens the door to all of the 
uncertainties associated with executive power intervention in the patent enforcement process. 
 
Even proposals to pass legislation regulating patent trolls raise the risk of inter-group wealth 
transfers of a predictable nature.  While there have been notable examples of abuse by patent 
trolls,109 the troll also offers independent inventors and small businesses an affordable way of 
enforcing their patent rights, and by doing so helps to support innovation incentives.  As I noted 
earlier, the troll, as a licensor of patents, ordinarily stands willing to license to all businesses 
rather than favor one business over another.  Moreover, in the current patent litigation 
environment trolls, as non-practicing entities, are relatively immune from threats of 
counterclaims typically used as a defensive mechanism by firms experienced in patent litigation.  
However, trolls are unnecessary to enforce patents from the perspective of large firms with in-
house legal departments, and their presence only makes it more difficult to deter infringement 
claims from smaller firms.  Hence, a statute that taxed or abolished trolls would benefit large 
firms at the expense of small ones. 
 
The courts already have at their hands virtually all of the tools necessary to regulate patent trolls.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Octane Fitness,110 making it easier for victims of abusive 
patent infringement litigation claims to collect attorneys fees, may be a sufficient regulatory 
mechanism for trolls.  A troll who recognizes that he may be forced to pay the attorneys fees of a 
party he sues for infringement will tend to bring only the strongest infringement claims.111  
 
The optimal program for addressing uncertainty in the patent system is through the common law 
process of making marginal changes in the scope of patent rights through judicial decision 
                                                 
108 To be sure, administrative patent law judges are considered to be independent of the federal patent office director, 
but some litigants have suggested that this purported independence is not nearly as complete as that of a federal 
judge. For example, hedge fund manage Kyle Bass claimed that federal patent office director Michelle Lee had 
directed the administrative patent judges not to institute any inter partes reviews of petitions he had filed to the 
agency. See Susan Decker, Bass Vows to Keep Fighting U.S. Drug Patents After Setbacks, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS 
(Sept. 3, 2015 6:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-03/bass-vows-to-keep-fighting-u-s-
drug-patents-after-setbacks. Moreover, Administrative Patent Judges do not have Article III tenure as do federal 
judges and the patent office director may designate the panels that decide cases in the manner consistent with his or 
her preferences. See Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 496 n.106 (2011); John F. Duffy, Are 
Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 908 (2009).  Administrative Patent 
Judges do not have the same protections as Article I administrative law judges, because their position is not created 
directly by the legislature. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 904, 904-05 (2009) (“Under 35 U.S.C. § 6, administrative patent judges of the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”) are appointed by the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”). 
That method of appointment is almost certainly unconstitutional, and the administrative patent judges serving under 
such appointments are likely to be viewed by the courts as having no constitutionally valid governmental 
authority.”)  In addition, administrative patent judges undergo a two-year probationary period. See Administrative 
Patent Judge Application, USAJobs, available at https://www.usajobs.gov/GetJob/PrintPreview/393260300 (last 
visited Jan. 1, 2015). 
109 See e.g., Susan Decker, Notorious ‘Patent Troll’ MPHJ Will Ease Tactics: FTC, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Nov. 6, 
2014 5:31 PM) (“MPHJ Technology Investments LLC will stop making deceptive claims. MPHJ, its sole owner Jay 
Mac Rust of Waco, Texas, and its law firm Farney Daniels had sent letters to thousands of small companies warning 
they face lawsuits unless they pay to license MPHJ patents, according to the FTC.”). 
110 Octane Fitness LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014). 
111 On the filing incentives of fee-shifting, see Hylton, Fee Shifting, supra note 6, at 444. 
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making.  Many of these marginal changes can be applied with surgical accuracy to fix a 
particular problem without creating new ones.  For example, the Court’s decision in Octane 
Fitness removes much of the need for any special statute from Congress enacting a “loser pays 
rule” for allocating attorney expenses in patent infringement litigation initiated by patent trolls.  
If Congress does eventually pass a statute adopting a “loser pays” rule for patent trolls, it is likely 
to include other provisions that tilt the playing field in favor of businesses that can afford to hire 
lobbyists.  Indeed, as I have already suggested, any statute regulating patent trolls is likely to 
effect a wealth transfer from small business and independent inventors toward established 
technology businesses.  Such wealth transfers work to reduce innovation among the numerous 
atomistic sources the patent system was designed to encourage and concentrate innovation 
incentives in corporations, with a likely reduction in the overall rate of innovation and shift in the 




Courts should adopt doctrinal rules that reduce strategic uncertainty in patent law.  This may 
seem to be an obvious statement, but it excludes some alternatives.  First, inherent uncertainty, 
due to ambiguity in the statement of a rule, does not need to be a focus of reform, because the 
common law process is necessarily uncertain at an early stage of analysis of a particular class of 
legal claims.  Second, the appearance of uncertainty that arises from changes in the composition 
of patent disputes should be understood for what it is.  Third, uncertainty that results from 
strategic behavior of litigants – what I have called strategic uncertainty here – is the only source 
of uncertainty that should be addressed by reform-minded courts; and it should be addressed by 
the courts rather than the legislature or hived off into the administrative process.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
